All beliefs are true *simpliciter*:
a defence of the infallibilist interpretation of Protagoras' Measure Doctrine in Plato's *Theaetetus*

Outline of chapter 1 of the dissertation
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This chapter proposes a new interpretation of Protagoras' Measure Doctrine ('man is the measure of all things') in Plato's *Theaetetus*. Protagoras holds that belief is factive: there are no false beliefs. According to the relativist interpretation, the consensus in recent scholarship, Protagoras does *not* hold that all beliefs are true *simpliciter*: instead, Protagoras holds that each belief is true *in relation to the believer*.[1] Various accounts have been given of what it would mean for a belief to be true in relation to the believer. I shall argue instead that Protagoras is an *infallibilist*: all beliefs are true *simpliciter*.[2] I shall argue that Protagoras is a *property relativist* (*not* a relativist about the truth of beliefs): things do not have properties by themselves but only in relation to individual believers and in accordance with individual believers' beliefs.[3] Protagoras' property relativism has implications for the truth condition of a belief: on the ordinary account, a

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[1] Cf. Erginel (2009), Castagnoli (2010), 4.2, and Evans (2015).

[2] Fine (1995) and Fine (1996) propose a different version of the infallibilist reading.

[3] Protagoras' property relativism has a restriction: truth, as a property of belief, is not relational. Some relativist interpreters (in particular Lee (2005), chapter 3) agree that Protagoras is a property relativist and think (wrongly, I shall argue) that this implies relativism about the truth of beliefs (despite the restriction) or that Protagoras eventually includes truth in its scope in a way that renders him a relativist about the truth of beliefs after all.

belief is true if things *by themselves* are as the believer believes they are; on Protagoras' account, a belief is true if things are, *in relation to the believer*, as the believer believes they are. Given such truth conditions, Protagoras' property relativism implies that all beliefs are true *simpliciter*. I shall interpret Protagoras' 'linguistic reforms' in this light: Protagoras rejects the ordinary way of expressing beliefs ('the stone is white') as it conceals the relational nature of properties and the compatibility of all beliefs. Protagoras' revisionary way of expressing beliefs ('the stone is white in relation to me') makes explicit the relational nature of properties and the compatibility of all beliefs. My interpretation accounts for Socrates' notorious twofold characterization of Protagoras' position: 'all beliefs are true' and 'each belief is true *for the believer*'. According to relativist readers, the former characterization is not strictly correct, and we should always supply the qualifier 'for the believer'. I shall argue that the two characterizations represent two different perspectives on the truth conditions of beliefs. The former characterization ('all beliefs are true') presupposes Protagoras' revisionary perspective: taking for granted Protagoras' account of truth conditions, that all beliefs are true means that the truth conditions of all beliefs obtain. The latter characterization ('each belief is true for the believer') presupposes the ordinary perspective: given the ordinary account of truth conditions, Protagoras' position is that the truth condition of a belief *as ordinarily understood* obtains *in relation to the believer*.

References

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