

Dr. Guus Willem Eelink

Curriculum Vitae

26 April 2022

Personal Data

Full name	Guus Willem Eelink
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Current Position

Weizsäcker Fellow, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Center, University of Tübingen.

Previous Positions

2020–2022	Logic Lektor, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford.
2019–2022	Lecturer in Ancient Philosophy, St Benet's Hall, University of Oxford.
2021	Lecturer in Ancient Philosophy, Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford.
2019–2020	Lecturer in Philosophy, Oriel College, University of Oxford.
2017–2018	Lecturer in Philosophy, Worcester College, University of Oxford.

Research Profile

AOS	Ancient Philosophy
AOC	Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Ethics

Education

2015–2020	DPhil (/PhD) in Philosophy, University of Oxford (Merton College).
2019	Visiting Assistant in Research at Yale University.
2014–2015	Master of Studies in Ancient Philosophy, University of Oxford (Wolfson College). Distinction.
2012–2014	Master of Science in Logic, University of Amsterdam.
2009–2012	Bachelor of Arts in Greek and Latin Language and Culture, University of Amsterdam. Distinction.

Publications

2021	Eelink, G. W. Timothy Clarke, <i>Aristotle and the Eleatic One</i> . <i>Ancient Philosophy Today: Dialogoi</i> 3(1), pp. 120-126. (Book review.)
2013	Eelink, G. W. and Sikimić, V. Defining Knowledge: Gettier-like Scenarios. <i>Belgrade Philosophical Annual</i> 26, pp. 7-22.

Talks

Invited

8 Dec. 2021	‘Is Protagoras a relativist about truth?’ Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Colloquium at the University of Tübingen.
14 Nov. 2021	‘The Digression in the <i>Theaetetus</i> .’ Faculty response to a paper by Cassie Finley (University of Iowa) at the Philosophy Graduate Conference, University of Oxford.
11 Nov. 2021	‘Is Protagoras a relativist about truth?’ Work in Progress Seminar, University of Campinas.
14 Sept. 2021	‘Is Protagoras a relativist about truth?’ Annual meeting of the Southern Association for Ancient Philosophy.
Postponed; tbc	‘Why does Radical Flux undermine definitions? An interpretation of <i>Theaetetus</i> 182e8-183a1.’ Conference on Ancient Logic, University of Geneva.
27 April 2019	‘Averroes, Hylomorphism, and Separate Intellect: A Response’. Response to a paper by Stephen Ogden (Catholic University of America) at the Yale Hylomorphism Conference, Yale University.
19 Oct. 2017	‘ <i>Theaetetus</i> 184-186 on the limits of perception.’ Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, University of Oxford.

Refereed

- 19 June 2019 | ‘All beliefs are true *simpliciter*: a defence of the infallibilist interpretation of Protagoras’ Measure Doctrine in Plato’s *Theaetetus*.’
Conference on Truth and Relativism in Ancient Philosophy, University of Groningen.
- 16 Jan. 2018 | ‘Not bringing things to a standstill: the *Theaetetus* on how (not) to speak about a world in radical flux.’
Conference on Language and Reality in Ancient Philosophy, University of Groningen.
- 20 May 2016 | ‘Perceiving and Judging in *Theaetetus* 184b-187a.’
British Postgraduate Philosophy Association (BPPA) Masterclass 2016 on ‘Perception and Perceptual Appearances in Ancient Philosophy’, University of Cambridge.

Other

- 26 Feb. 2020 | ‘*Theaetetus* 179c-183a on why definitions need stability.’
Oriental College Philosophy Group, University of Oxford.
- 29 Nov. 2019 | ‘Why knowledge is not perception: *Theaetetus* 184b-187a.’
Triangle Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy Cambridge/KCL/Oxford/UCL. Response by Chandler Clark (UCL).
- 21 June 2018 | Title: ‘Protagoras in the *Theaetetus*: a revisionary infallibilist reading.’
Graduate Conference in Ancient Philosophy, University of Oxford.
- 26 May 2017 | Title: ‘The Refutation of Extreme Flux in Plato’s *Theaetetus*.’
Classics Work in Progress Seminar, Classics Faculty, University of Oxford.
- 8 March 2017 | Title: ‘The Secret Doctrine in Plato’s *Theaetetus*.’
Ockham Society, University of Oxford.

Broader Audiences

- 2022, tbc | Title: ‘Socrates and social media.’ (in Dutch)
Cultural event in Bredevoort, The Netherlands. (Invited.)
- 6 January 2021 | Title: ‘Socrates and mind–body dualism.’ (in Dutch)
Cultural event in Winterswijk, The Netherlands. (Invited.)
- 9 March 2017 | Title: ‘“A Man is the Measure of all Things”: Understanding Plato’s Protagoras.’
Merton College Middle Common Room colloquium series.

Teaching (University of Oxford)

Tutorials and Classes (2016 - 2022)

Frege–Russell–Wittgenstein, Introduction to Logic, Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle’s *Physics*, Early Greek Philosophy, Ethics, Introduction to Philosophy, Moral Philosophy (Mill’s *Utilitarianism*), Plato’s *Euthyphro* and *Meno*, Plato’s *Republic*, Plato’s *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*.

Supervision (2017 - 2022)

MSt in Ancient Philosophy thesis on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* (graduate supervisor), undergraduate thesis on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and logic, undergraduate thesis on Ethics.

Recognition

Nominated by students for the Oxford Student Union Teaching Award (2018).

Administration, Academic Service, and Organization

2016–presently	Undergraduate admissions (designing tasks, interviewing, decision-making), University of Oxford.
2018–2020	Graduate Mentor in Philosophy, Merton College, University of Oxford.
2018	Oxford Graduate Conference in Ancient Philosophy, 21 June 2021 (main organizer).
2016–2017	Committee member of the Ockham Society, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford.
2013–2014	Co-organizer of the biweekly Logic Tea Seminar at the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam.
2011–2013	Editor/author for <i>Wau</i> , student periodical focusing on the study of Classics at the University of Amsterdam.

Main Scholarships and Research Grants

2018	Research Grant from the Hinton Clarendon Research Fund, Worcester College, University of Oxford, in connection with my stay at Yale University in 2019.
2015	Merton College/Faculty of Philosophy Scholarship 2015, Merton College and the University of Oxford, covering three years (2015-2018) of the DPhil in Philosophy.
2014	Cultuurfondsbeurs by Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds, funded by the Marta Gnyf Fonds for students in the Humanities, in connection with the MSt in Ancient Philosophy. Scholarship for students from the Netherlands pursuing a second postgraduate degree abroad.

2014 | Oxford Graduate Scholarship, supported by the Higher Education Funding Council for England, in connection with the MSt in Ancient Philosophy.

Competence in Languages other than English

Dutch	Native
German	Complete passive proficiency (listening and reading), basic active proficiency (speaking and writing)
French	Reading knowledge
Ancient Greek	Scholarly understanding
Latin	Scholarly understanding

Abstract of the Doctoral Thesis

My thesis is entitled ‘Not bringing things to a standstill: Plato’s *Theaetetus* on how (not) to speak about a world in which knowledge is perception.’ My thesis focuses on a section of the *Theaetetus* in which Plato discusses and criticizes two claims: Theaetetus’ claim that knowledge is perception and Protagoras’ claim that man is the measure of all things. In chapter 1, I argue that, according to Plato, both claims entail that all perceptual beliefs are true. Further, I argue that the processual ontology that Plato ascribes to Protagoras is meant to underpin the claim that all perceptual beliefs are true. In chapter 2, I argue against a highly influential interpretation — subscribed to by most interpreters — according to which Protagoras is a relativist about truth. I argue instead that Protagoras as portrayed in the *Theaetetus* is committed to the view that all beliefs are *absolutely* true. I argue that Plato successfully shows that Protagoras’ view, so understood, is self-undermining. In chapter 3, I argue that Plato successfully demonstrates that a radical version of Protagoras’ processual ontology is incoherent. I argue that the incoherence in question consists in the fact that the radical version excludes any diachronic persistence, whereas processes need some diachronic persistence to unfold. In chapter 4, I argue that Plato rejects Theaetetus’ claim that knowledge is perception on the basis of the view that the objects of knowledge are true propositions, whereas perception cannot have propositions as its objects.

Research References

Prof. Lesley Brown *University of Oxford*
Prof. Luca Castagnoli *University of Oxford*
Prof. Nicholas Denyer *University of Cambridge* (doctoral examiner)
Prof. Gail Fine *Cornell University* (doctoral examiner)
Prof. Michail Peramatzis *University of Oxford*

Teaching References

Prof. Luca Castagnoli *University of Oxford*
Prof. Marion Durand *University of Oxford*
Prof. Paolo Fait *University of Oxford*

Prof. Bernard Gowers *University of Oxford*
Prof. Michail Peramatzis *University of Oxford*
Prof. Natalia Waights Hickman *University of Oxford*